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7Freedom, Resistance, Agency
Manuel Dries
When we encounter a resistance and have to give in, we feel unfree, when we do not
give in but compel it to give in to us, free. I.e., it is this feeling of our increase of
force, which we name ‘freedom of the will’: the conscious awareness that our force
compels, in relation to a force that is compelled.
(NL 1885, KSA 11, 34[250])1
I can handle myself in the same way as a gardener his plants: I can distance
motives from myself, in distancing myself from a place and company [Gesell-
schaft], I can place motives in my proximity. I can cultivate the propensity [den
Hang], to proceed against myself in this gardener-like way, artiﬁcially [künstlich]
or let it wither away.
(NL 1880, KSA 9, 7[30])
1 Introduction
The aim of this article is to show (1) that freedom and agency are among Nietzsche’s
central concerns, (2) that his much-discussed interest in power in fact originates in a
ﬁrst-person account of freedom, and (3) that this novel understanding of the
phenomenon of freedom informs his ‘theory’ of agency. I will argue that while
Nietzsche questions the weight philosophers have given to the ﬁrst-person perspec-
tive and consciousness, these remain essential not only to his initial analysis but also
to his later conception of freedom and agency. While his rejection of metaphysical
free will and moral desert has had a signiﬁcant impact on contemporary ethics,
the sense in which Nietzsche continues to use the term ‘freedom’ afﬁrmatively
remains largely unnoticed. He develops a sophisticated drive-driven psychological
1 Throughout I use standard abbreviations for Nietzsche’s works. Nietzsche’s posthumously published
writings (NL) are cited by year, KSA (Nietzsche 1988) volume number, followed by notebook and fragment
number. For NL 1885, KSA 11, 34[250] I also use division IX of the KGW (Nietzsche 2001–), which offers
Nietzsche’s late notebooks in diplomatic transcriptions that reveal his revisions, additions, and cancella-
tions. I have relied on, and at times modiﬁed, existing translations of Nietzsche’s texts.
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motivational account: reﬂective judgement and reasons can motivate by means of the
affects or affective orientations agents have due to their drives; he claims that due to a
strong preference—we could say with Mele, a ‘standing desire’ for freedom (it will
soon become clear what Nietzsche means by ‘freedom’)—agents can generate the
necessary motivational affects to unify their drives in view of (certain) long-term
goals. Thus, when in his later philosophy Nietzsche envisages free agents who
not only feel free but whose belief in their agency is justiﬁed, he has replaced the
metaphysical picture (of agents who are mysterious, noumenally free, causa sui
agents) with a naturalized, drive-driven psychological view of agency that he thinks
has the resources to cope with the problem of afﬁrmation that arises under nihilism
conditions.
Let me clarify some terminology ﬁrst. ‘Drive’ and ‘affect’ are key concepts for
Nietzsche.2 He uses ‘drives’ in the sense of relatively ﬁxed and recurring tendencies
that orient and structure behaviour and perception. ‘Affects’ refer to the ﬁrst-
personal experience of an orientation, usually expressive of a nuanced for-or-against
attitude towards some feature of the world. Affects and drives are internally related:
affects depend on and are expressive of an agent’s or self-system’s drives, thereby
providing the qualitative structuring of an agent’s world.3 I will sometimes speak of
dynamic, sentient self-systems rather than selves, persons, or agents. This is for
heuristic reasons when I try to explicate the psycho-physiological mechanisms that
Nietzsche discusses. ‘Dynamic’ emphasizes the relational and processual nature of a
self-system that is not static or ﬁxed and displays a capacity for self-regulation.
‘Sentient’ indicates that the self-system is not to be conceived as a physical system
only, but rather, in contrast to a mere physical system, as capable of making sense of
its environment, of having ﬁrst-person experiential states, and of forming beliefs and
goals that affect its behaviour. Finally, ‘system’ circumscribes merely a functional unit,
a composite of drives, affects, habits, memory, language, beliefs, and—ultimately—also
what Nietzsche calls ‘ideals’.
In Sections 2–4 I show that Nietzsche locates the basic idea of freedom in
the experience of, or ‘what it is like’, to overcome resistances. In Sections 5–7
I sketch the Nietzschean hypothesis of a sophisticated, non-reductive motivational
theory: due to an embodied, standing sense of self-efﬁcacy, and drive (or standing
desire) for self-efﬁcacy (what Nietzsche refers to, rather obscurely, in his notion of
‘will to power’) agents generate, in unconscious and conscious mental simulations,
the motivational affective states necessary for action. While Nietzsche often assumes
2 See, among others, Richardson (2004, 2008), Janaway (2007, 2012), Leiter (2008), Gemes (2013),
Katsafanas (this volume), Kail (this volume).
3 The relationship between affects, drives, instincts, and values is complicated and far from fully worked
out by Nietzsche. Non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements feature in Nietzsche’s attempts to clarify their
relationships.
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that this motivational mechanism operates largely unreﬂectively—particularly in the
ascetic he criticizes—it is argued that reﬂective judgements and conscious reasons
may motivate via this embodied sense of self-efﬁcacy.
2 Neither a Free nor an Unfree Will
Commentators are in agreement that Nietzsche devalues consciousness and leaves
little room for any conventional understanding of free will and agency. He is
unambiguous in regarding any conception of freedom as absolutely self-causing a
metaphysical megalomania, an anti-natural invention typical of the Judaeo-Christian
tradition. Free will thus understood would be incompatible with an understanding of
human beings as natural entities. He thinks that the idea of free will was invented in
order to warrant the responsibility needed for the purposes of socialization and the
justiﬁcation of punishment.
Commentators have suspected that Nietzsche’s rejection of free will and his
emphasis on psycho-physiological factors (such as drives and affects) over learned
social factors or rationality lead him to reject the ontological domain of conscious-
ness and the mental in favour of the ontological domain of the physical, thus
subscribing to a version of determinism. This account is problematic, as Nietzsche
explicitly rebuffs the simple inversion from a ﬁctitious absolute autonomy to absolute
heteronomy. He actually advocates giving up not only the belief in free will but also
the belief in its opposite, what he calls ‘the myth of the unfree will’. He proposes a
change of categories4 in the much-discussed passage of BGE 21.5 Rather than
conceiving of a self as either free or determined, or a compatibilism that allows the
coexistence of moral responsibility and determinism, Nietzsche considers that the
self is better characterized assuming degrees of freedom, degrees of strength and
weakness. We see how puzzling Nietzsche’s view can at ﬁrst seem when we consider a
note where he says that while willing is perfectly possible, this does not entail belief in
the existence of will (see NL 1884, KSA 11, 26[254]). And yet, far from abandoning talk
of freedom, the late Nietzsche still uses the term ‘freedom’. As I will show, he refers ﬁrst
and foremost to a ﬁrst-person experience of agency. Once we understand Nietzsche’s
re-description of the phenomenon of free will we understand the sense in which he
rejects traditional free will and advocates an entirely different kind of freedom (a kind
4 On this passage, see Owen and Ridley (2003: 74) and Leiter (2007); also HH I 16. See also the earlier
1884 unpublished note: ‘Das Problem von Freiheit und Unfreiheit des W<illen>s geho¨rt in die Vorho¨fe der
Philosophie—für mich gibt es keinenWillen. Daß der Glaube an denWillen notwendig ist, um zu wollen—
ist Unsinn’ (NL 1884, KSA 11, 26[254]).
5 ‘If any one should ﬁnd out in this manner the crass stupidity of the celebrated conception of “free will” /
and put it out of his head altogether, I beg of him to carry his “enlightenment” a step further, and also put
out of his head the contrary of this monstrous conception of “free will”: I mean “unfree will,” which is
tantamount to a misuse of cause and effect. One should not wrongly materialize “cause” and “effect,” as the
natural philosophers do [ . . . ] The “un-free will” is mythology; in real life it is only a question of strong and
weak wills’ (BGE 21).
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of agency par excellence, which enables self-control and the ability to set oneself and
afﬁrm complex goals and projects that are no longer ascetic).
Nietzsche is a naturalist of sorts who aims to ‘retranslate man back into nature’
and to shift the focus towards the body. However, he does not attempt anything
logically impossible, namely to translate the mental into the physical, conceived as a
different ontological realm that would, by deﬁnition, exclude the mental. His ‘reduc-
tion’ is really a ‘translation’, and it is explanatory rather than metaphysical (Kail, this
volume). Like his ‘educator’ Schopenhauer (but without the metaphysics of a world
will behind a merely apparent world of Vorstellungen), he regards the human as
continuous with animal nature, thereby bridging or exploiting the intersecting set of
the language games of animal and human. He also thinks that humans have cognitive
capacities that most animals do not have. He insists that the human body is in need of
critical attention (e.g. BGE 200), which implies that he assumes the possibility of
change. In this sense then, such a shaping of what one is is possible, and what role
consciousness and deliberation could possibly play in critical attention and self-
control remains a much-debated question. When a self-system controls its drives,
or when it is in an undecided state induced by competing, incompatible drives, he at
times seems to assume that our intellect ‘takes sides’ (D 109).6 But is this ‘taking
sides’ doing any work that contributes to the process and ﬁnal outcome of what we
would call a deliberation?
One thing seems clear: Nietzsche’s naturalism is not ﬁrst and foremost theoretical
or metaphysical. As Han-Pile has recently shown, he actually intertwines naturalistic
and transcendental aspects in his notion of ‘naturalised a priori conditions’ (2009).
He is a practical philosopher-psychologist who wants to understand what is required
for ‘genuine proﬁciency and ﬁnesse in waging war with oneself (which is to say: the
ability to control and outwit oneself )’ (BGE 200).7
Even if free will in the traditional sense might have become an untenable position,
and conscious, reﬂective judgement might not be as immediately efﬁcacious as hitherto
assumed, the possibility of critical attention, change, and some conscious control,
matches our intuitions. Nietzsche’s own philosophical efforts, too, seem premised on
his belief that changing some of our beliefs, how we think and feel about the world,
might make a difference. But in what sense and in what circumstances?
We ﬁnd a ﬁrst clue in the psychological explanation for the idea of responsibility
and desert’s free will (i.e. the kind of free will that allows us to attribute moral blame
6 ‘to become aware that we are suffering from the vehemence of a drive presupposes the existence of
another equally vehement or even more vehement drive, and that a struggle is in process in which the
intellect has to take sides’ (D 109).
7 This is just one example that shows that Nietzsche not only attacks a certain Cartesian substantive
model of the self, which advocates a new understanding of the mind as physical, but also criticizes the mind
as containing problematic tendencies, incorporated errors that in turn need our conscious attention. As
Katsafanas (2005) has argued, Nietzsche thinks that becoming conscious of certain tacitly held beliefs, or
changing certain beliefs, or adopting certain consciously held beliefs, will have a real effect. I discuss the
latter in my Dries (2013).
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and praise).8 Assuming sole responsibility for one’s actions is really the attempt
of a weak agent—who ﬁnds himself in a world he did not choose, often hostile
to his desires and aims, propelled towards a future that is largely unknown and
unpredictable—to transform himself into someone with a higher perceived self-
efﬁcacy, i.e. someone who has changed his belief about his capability to produce
effects. A false belief nevertheless might have had beneﬁcial effects in giving weak
agents a different sense of agency, an authorship over their actions, and a feeling of
independence.
With this is mind, I wish to turn to what I believe is Nietzsche’s less well-known
analysis of the phenomenology of freedom, an analysis that shapes his entire later
philosophy.
3 FreedomAs Function of Resistance (Resistance Axiom I)
Why do we, despite evidence to the contrary coming, for example, from the neuro-
sciences, continue to believe in and use the term ‘freedom’?9 Why is it that we so
often feel free and feel it when we are not? Nietzsche puts forward an argument for
our recalcitrance in giving up this talk of freedom. One of his earliest notes on the
subject gives away the direction his later philosophy will take. He writes: ‘The
pleasure in power is to be explained from the displeasure experienced a hundred
times from dependency’ (NL 1876–7, KSA 8, 23[63]).
It is in an 1885 notebook passage that Nietzsche provides a fuller description of the
phenomenology of freedom and offers an explanation for this obstinacy of our belief
in it. It is interesting and carries weight because Nietzsche went back to revise it. In its
earliest version, this passage read as follows:
When we encounter a resistance and have to give in, we feel unfree, when we do not give in,
free. It is this feeling of our more of force, which we name ‘freedom of the will’: our force,
which compels, against a force that is compelled. (Notebook N VII 1, 1st version of NL 1885,
KSA 11, 34[250]; the underlinings are Nietzsche’s)10
8 ‘The causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has yet been conceived, it is a sort of logical violation
and unnaturalness; [ . . . ] The desire for “freedom of will” in the superlative, metaphysical sense, such as
still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated, the desire to bear the entire and ultimate
responsibility for one’s actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society
therefrom, involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui, and, with more than Munchausen
daring, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the slough of nothingness’ (BGE 21).
9 Sections 7.3 and 7.4 draw on my ‘The Feeling of Doing: Nietzsche on Agent Causation’ (Dries 2013).
10 I quote here the transcription of Notebook N VII I according to division IX.1 of Nietzsche’s Werke
Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGW), ed. M-L. Haase and M. Kohlenbach (Berlin, New York: Walter de
Gruyter): ‘Wo wir einem Widerstande begegnen und ihm nachgeben müssen, fühlen wir uns unfrei, wo
wir ihm nicht nachgeben, frei. Es ist das Gefühl unseres Mehr von Kraft, welches wir mit “Freiheit des
Willen” bezeichnen: unsere Kraft, welche zwingt, gegen eine Kraft, welche gezwungen wird.’
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In this passage Nietzsche is silent on whether ‘feeling unfree or free’ and the ‘feeling
of our more of force’ are conscious ﬁrst-person mental states or not. When he
revises the passage, he explicitly addresses this question and adds that ‘freedom of
the will’ refers to the conscious awareness of effort or, better put, efﬁcacious effort or
awareness of self-efﬁcacy within a resistance relationship. With his revisions, the
passage reads:
When we encounter a resistance and have to give in, we feel unfree, when we do not give in but
compel it to give in to us, free. I.e., it is this feeling of our more of force, which we name
‘freedom of the will’: the conscious awareness of our force compelling, in relation to a force that
is compelled. (Notebook N VII 1, 2nd version of 34[250]; Nietzsche’s underlinings, changes
and additions in italics)11
Nietzsche’s analysis of the phenomenology of doing suggests that our deeply embed-
ded belief in ourselves as free agents originates in resistance relationships that a self-
system is consciously aware of—from the immediate awareness of self-efﬁcacy
registered simultaneously with a resistance relationship. This awareness or self-
feeling, Nietzsche claims, provides ﬁrst-person access to, and feedback on, the
relational status of a self-system.12
11 ‘Wo wir einem Widerstande begegnen und ihm nachgeben müssen, fühlen wir uns unfrei, wo wir
ihm nicht nachgeben sondern ihn zwingen, uns nachzugeben, frei. Dh. es ist das Gefühl unseres Mehr von
Kraft, welches wir mit “Freiheit des Willen” bezeichnen: das Bewusstsein davon, dass unsere Kraft zwingt,
im Verhältnis zu einer Kraft, welche gezwungen wird.’ I use the English ‘compel’ in my translation of the
German ‘zwingen’, as the German describes a phenomenology that refers to psychological force, authority,
and control rather than primarily any act of ‘forcing’ in a physical sense. As Reginster (2007) has shown
with regard to will to power, the phenomenology of freedom that Nietzsche describes here depends on
resistance and demands resistance of many forms, but not domination or overpowering (cf. also TI IX 38).
12 Nietzsche had an acute sense of the importance of self-efﬁcacy and perceived self-efﬁcacy, i.e.
someone’s conscious or unconscious belief about their capabilities to produce effects. As Bandura (1977,
1978, 1994, 2000) and others have since shown, self-efﬁcacy levels are indeed very important and have been
proven to ‘affect life choices, level of motivation, quality of functioning, resilience to adversity and
vulnerability to stress and depression’ (1994: 81). They have further shown that the perception of self-
efﬁcacy can change through social persuasion, but depends at heart on ‘inferences from somatic and
emotional states of personal strength and vulnerabilities’ and on ‘mastery experiences’ (81). Nietzsche
assumes that the ﬁrst-person awareness of strengths and vulnerabilities provided an adaptive advantage of
sentient organisms over non-sentient ones and led to certain valuations that are expressed in our primary
and learned drives. Hunger, the drive to eat, or thirst, the drive to drink, would thus have their origins in an
awareness of weak self-efﬁcacy that results from a lack of nutrition or water. The minimal self is for
Nietzsche a kind of feedback control system that, put crudely, we can picture like a thermostat. A drive is
conceived as a certain need that, if not satisﬁed, puts the sentient self-system in a negative state or a state of
tension that motivates sense-making and agency. Once a drive-induced affective orientation leads to the
satisfying of the drive, a kind of equilibrium or homeostasis is reached until the next need arises and puts
the system back into disequilibrium (on empirical evidence for homeostasis and its signiﬁcance for
neurobiology and psychology, see e.g. Damasio 2010). While little could be done to affect or change
primary drives, Nietzsche targets many secondary, or learned drives which should be subjected to
genealogical investigation, and, if no longer approved of, e.g. because of their nihilistic, ascetic tendency,
should be unlearned (see, e.g., D 109, where Nietzsche describes how one can unlearn or at least control
drives). Based on ﬁrst-person experience, Nietzsche forms the hypothesis regarding an ‘instinct of freedom’
(GM II 17 and 18) or, better, a drive for efﬁcacy or efﬁcacious agency that, in the same way thirst monitors
hydration levels, monitors the self-system’s overall resistance relationships, i.e. its levels of overall efﬁcacy
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Nietzsche’s writings show that he forms a kind of explanatory hypothesis about
self-systems: our sense of agency and ownership expresses (we might even say with
Damasio ‘is tracking’) a self-system’s overall resistance relationships, i.e. its levels of
efﬁcacy as an embedded agent, its relative strength and weakness in any given
situation. And while this sense of agency might lead to the false belief in some
ﬁctitious Cartesian pilot, a soul substance, as evidence for a ‘doer behind our deeds’,
Nietzsche nevertheless sees this sense of agency not simply as epiphenomenal but as
intrinsically motivating, functioning like a standing desire: self-systems (unless they are
a pathological case) need to feel themselves as efﬁcacious agents. For example, in the
Genealogy he uses this hypothesis to explain the emergence of what Nietzsche calls
pejoratively ‘slave morality’. Group or society formation, Nietzsche argues, prevents
members from discharging their drives in the way they used to. As a consequence,
these agents suffer from a lack of external resistance: ‘Lacking external enemies and
obstacles, and forced into oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom’ motivates
and leads to an internalization of man: ‘All instincts which are not discharged
outwardly turn inwards’ (GM II 16). The absence of resistance scenarios that, accord-
ing to Nietzsche’s hypothesis, sustain the sense of self-efﬁcacious agency, motivated the
‘desire to give form to oneself as a piece of difﬁcult, resisting, suffering matter’ (GM II
18; my emphasis). This is how those agents, by turning themselves into resistance
scenarios, restored their sense of self-efﬁcacy and agency. The feeling of unfreedom,
being merely constrained by society without being able to do anything about it, and
the need for self-efﬁcacious agency are assumed to have the motivational force
needed for one to engage in actions that restore the latter.
It is this experiential feedback mechanism that ﬁxes the meaning of ‘free’.
(Nietzsche argues that those who suffered most from heteronomy and unfreedom
later misappropriated it. They devised a language game in which those who lacked
efﬁcacy restored it by endowing themselves with ‘free will’, ‘absolute freedom’, and
‘absolute responsibility’.) Based on his phenomenological analysis, Nietzsche posits
what I wish to call his ‘resistance axiom’ (RA) of freedom:
The degree to which a self-system feels free (is aware of itself as efﬁcacious agent
and author of its actions) is a function of a self-system’s efﬁcacious effort in its
resistance relationships. Awareness of inefﬁcacy motivates self-systems to restore
their sense of agency.
The self-system feels free, feels itself an efﬁcacious agent, when it is engaged in resistance
relationships with which it can cope. The self-system feels unfree, is aware of other-
agency, when it is engaged in resistance relationships with which it cannot cope.
as an embedded agent and its relative strength and weakness. On a primary drive level, unconscious and
conscious awareness of efﬁcacy, this is Nietzsche’s speculative hypothesis, motivates the other drives to
coordinate in such a way as to regain a certain level of perceived self-efﬁcacy, but he also believes that the feeling
of freedom depends in important ways on the level of resistance with which a self knows it can cope.
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I do not have the space to go into contemporary discussions on these issues. All
I want to show here is that Nietzsche’s ﬁndings seem to be very similar to the results
of Bayne and Levy’s recent article on ‘The Feeling of Doing’:
Although the experience of authorship is . . . a central component of the phenomenology of
agency generally, it appears to be particularly vivid in experiences of effort. [ . . . ] If the
experience of authorship ever takes the experience of agent causation, we suggest that it is in
contexts in which the experience of effort is particularly vivid. (2006: 63)
What have we established so far? Nietzsche seems to think that (1) our sense of self as
agents and author of our actions is a function of a self-system’s ability to cope with
resistance, (2) the more effort and resistance a self-system can master, the higher its
degree of self-efﬁcacy and perceived freedom, and (3) if a self-system becomes aware of
other-efﬁcacy, thus feeling unfree, it is likely to motivate action that restores self-efﬁcacy.
4 The Tenacity of Feeling Free
Nietzsche assumes that awareness of self-efﬁcacy is deeply embedded. His natural-
istic understanding of self-systems as biological organisms seems already to conﬁrm
the resistance axiom on an organic level, as a kind of proprioceptive, self-regulatory
awareness.13 ‘In the entire organism’, he writes, ‘there is constantly the overcoming
of innumerable resistances/inhibitions.’ Something like a feeling of agency arises:
‘because we live in a state of innumerable individual pleasurable incitations, this
expresses itself in the feeling of well-being of the entire person’ (NL 1875, KSA 8, 9
[1]).14 Nietzsche hypothesizes that resistance relationships and awareness thereof
exist already on the organic level. He describes what cognitive science today refers
to as proprioception and interoception, our unconscious and conscious awareness
of the states of our internal organs and muscles, which he believes result in a proto-
conscious, pre-reﬂective sense of agency:
the sense of well-being as the feeling of power triggered by little obstacles: because in the entire
organism there is constantly the overcoming of innumerable resistances/inhibitions,—this
13 Shortly after his remark on freedom he writes on experience in general: ‘die Ermo¨glichung der
Erfahrung, dadurch daß das wirkliche Geschehen, sowohl auf Seiten der einwirkenden Kräfte, als auf Seiten
unserer gestaltenden, ungeheuer vereinfacht wird: so dass es ähnliche u. gleiche Dinge zu geben scheint.
Erkenntniß ist Fälschung des Vielartigen u Unzählbaren zum Gleichen, Ähnlichen, Abzählbaren. Also ist
Leben nur Vermo¨ge eines solchen Fälschungs-Apparates mo¨glich. Denken ist ein fälschendes Umgestalten,
Fühlen ist ein fälschendes Umgestalten, Wollen ist ein fälschendes Umgestalten—: in dem Allen liegt die
Kraft der Assimilation: welche voraussetzt einenWillen etwas uns Gleich zu machen’ (N VII 1, 3). See also:
‘Das Mittel ist: die Einführung vollständiger Fiktionen als Schemata, nach denen wir uns das geistige
Geschehen einfacher denken als es ist. Erfahrung ist nur mo¨glich mit Hilfe von Gedächtniß: Gedächtniß ist
nur mo¨glich vermo¨ge einer Abkürzung eines geistigen Vorganges zum Zeichen’ (N VII 1, 6:12–26). For the
pervasive function of signs, see Abel (1998, 2004, and this volume).
14 ‘denn wir leben in einem Zustande zahlloser einzelner lustvoller Reizungen, das Wohlgefühl des
ganzen Menschen ist der Ausdruck davon’.
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victorious feeling becomes conscious as the overall feeling [Gesammtgefühl] of gaiety, ‘free-
dom’. (NL 1886–7, KSA 12, 5[50]53)15
It comes as no surprise that sentient self-systems cannot really free themselves from
the freedom assumption, if the ‘Freiheitsgefühl’ (NL 1886–7, KSA 12, 5[50]48)
denotes its overall sense of well-being and thus tracks the proper functioning of an
organism’s resistance relationships.16
But it is not only on the level of the functioning organism that the sentient self-
system is engaged in and seeking resistance activities. Nietzsche sees continuity with
the more complex, higher-order cognitive functions of self-systems. Also, in its
sense-making ability to see something as something, viewed from an intentional
stance, Nietzsche sees conﬁrmation that it is always dealing with and even seeking
resistances. Even higher cognitive activities, such as imagining, naming, and think-
ing, he interprets as resistance activities that sustain our sense of agency. As long as a
self-system is able to do so successfully, it feels ‘free’.17 This resistance awareness
leads to what Nietzsche calls ‘our basic belief ’: ‘[t]hat we are efﬁcacious entities,
forces’ (N VII 1, 6).18
This explains, Nietzsche thinks, why our belief in freedom is so recalcitrant,
tenacious.19 Freedom, thus understood, has nothing to do with some mysterious,
noumenal property that enables autonomous agents to start causal chains out of
nothing. Nietzsche’s analysis of the phenomenology of freedom explains his belief
that human beings—due to their unconscious and conscious awareness of how they
are doing as natural, embedded, sentient self-systems—might be motivated and
behave according to a drive or ‘instinct of freedom’ (as he writes in the Genealogy),
and ‘function’ almost like feedback control systems: our basic sense of self as agent is
15 ‘das Wohlgefühl als das an leichtenWiderständen sich auslo¨sende Machtgefühl: denn im gesammten
Organismus giebt es fortwährend Überwindung zahlloser Hemmungen,—dies Siegsgefühl kommt als
Gesammtgefühl zum Bewußtsein, als Lustigkeit, “Freiheit”.’ See, for example, Damasio on empirical
evidence for the hypothesis of a ‘protoself ’ consisting of primordial feelings that ‘map’ and ‘reﬂect the
current state of the body along varied dimensions, for example, along the scale that ranges from pleasure to
pain’ (2010: 22, 272–3). For a recent defense of Nietzsche’s sensualism, see Riccardi (2013).
16 See also: ‘before “thinking” began, there must have been already a “composing”, the shaping faculty is
more original than that of “thinking” ’/‘bevor also “gedacht” wurde, muss schon gedichtet worden sein, der
formende Sinn ist ursprünglicher als der “denkende” ’ (NL 1885, KSA 11, 40[17]).
17 Neuroscience today distinguishes between a sense of agency (‘I initiated the action’) and a sense
of ownership (‘It is my body’) (e.g. Gallagher 2000 and Tsakiris, Bosbach, and Gallagher 2007). Sense of
agency and sense of ownership can come apart in involuntary action (e.g. a push) but are of particular
importance for the investigation of pathological disorders like schizophrenia, Tourette’s, and alien hand
syndrome (see also Zahavi 2005).
18 ‘Dass wir wirkende Wesen, Kräfte sind, ist unser Grundglaube’.
19 ‘Man hüte sich, von diesem ganzen Phänomen deshalb schon gering zu denken, weil es von
vornherein hässlich und schmerzhaft ist. Im Grunde ist es ja dieselbe aktive Kraft, die in jenen Gewalt-
Künstlern und Organisatoren grossartiger am Werke ist und Staaten baut, welche hier, innerlich, kleiner,
kleinlicher, in der Richtung nach rückwärts, im “Labyrinth der Brust”, um mit Goethe zu reden, sich das
schlechte Gewissen schafft und negative Ideale baut, eben jener Instinkt der Freiheit (in meiner Sprache
geredet: der Wille zur Macht)’ (GM II 18).
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the ‘monitoring’ of the self-system’s overall resistance relationships and leads to pro
and contra affective and emotional states that structure a self-system’s orientation
and action.
5 The Ascetic ‘Mechanism of Willing’
It is not only our immediate actions (drinking a sip of water right now because
I’m thirsty and feeling rather weak) but also our larger cognitively held beliefs
and world views that are related to our need for self-efﬁcacy, Nietzsche argues.
This is why he ﬁnds ‘morality’, in particular Christian morality, such an inter-
esting case study. As has already been indicated, Nietzsche describes its emer-
gence as a shift in beliefs motivated by the low sense of self-efﬁcacy of the weak
and it culminates in a world in which the ‘strong’ are ‘evil’ and the ‘weak’ are
‘good’ and are endowed with ‘free will’. While Nietzsche’s philosophy can be seen
as a multifaceted attack on the consequences of this shift that instituted a
nihilistic morality, it is also a shift that Nietzsche ﬁnds extremely interesting
and from which he thinks one can learn a great deal, in particular about how
agency and agential motivation work.
For Nietzsche, Christian morality is highly problematic. Low sense of agency and
self-efﬁcacy—their unfreedom—leads to an affective-cognitive state, namely resent-
ment, which is expressive of their unsuccessful resistance against their oppressors.
Such people maintain their sense of agency and self-efﬁcacy only through the
internalized struggle against their own drives and affects. Nevertheless, Nietzsche
has great respect for the achievement. When a morality is so successful in disciplining
self-systems, then we are bound to learn something by identifying its tools. And
identifying its tools might be of particular importance if, as Nietzsche believed, the
Christian moral framework has run its course, while it is still unclear what a non-
ascetic agency might look like (as I said earlier, this is, I believe, Nietzsche’s central
concern).
There is no room to rehearse the detailed arguments of GM and A here. Christian
morality relied on values that are auto-destructive and lead to what Nietzsche calls
‘nihilism’, which denotes both a kind of disorientation and despair. While Nietzsche
recognizes that the ﬁgurative ‘Death of God’ might make new agents a real possibil-
ity, he also anticipates an existential despair that arises when the highest values have
devalued themselves, as well as ‘disorientation’ (I use Reginster’s terminology here).
Values that were universally binding based on the authority of a deity enabled agents
to orient themselves and motivates them to constrain their Pleistocene ﬁrst-order
drives. Real freedom lies not in reverting back to our older, pre-moral Pleistocene
drive selves. Thus, the post-Christian might feel free, Nietzsche thinks, but he is
no longer an agent and is in danger of merely becoming the playing ﬁeld of his or
her ﬁrst-order drives. Nietzsche’s ideal of real freedom would also require a new,
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non-ascetic self-disciplining and responsibility for one’s actions. Thus it seems
crucial to ask what we can learn from Christianity. How did the ‘ascetics’ manage
to discipline themselves? Could the Christian mechanism perhaps be deployed in
non-ascetic ways?
In a less well-known note, Nietzsche describes the mechanism of internalization
that he thinks achieves the disciplining of drives through sublimation, with the help
of the imagination:
The internalisation occurs when powerful drives, that are denied external discharge with the
installation of peace and society, seek internal compensation, with the assistance of the
imagination [my emphasis]. The need for enmity, cruelty, revenge, violence turns backward,
‘withdraws’; in the pursuit of knowledge is avarice and conquest; in the artist the withdrawn
power of the imagination and lying appears; the drives are transformed into demons, against
which there is strife, etc. (NL 1887, KSA 12, 8[4])20
The sublimation described is not speciﬁcally Christian. The pursuit of knowledge and
art are nothing that Nietzsche disapproves of per se. Great artists are exemplars of
drive discipline. Those who suddenly found themselves members of groups or
societies that denied the discharge of their ﬁrst-order aggressive and sexual drives
sublimate the latter in their pursuit of knowledge and art. They used their imagin-
ation to simulate scenarios that would help them control the drives that would
otherwise interfere with and endanger the groups or societies, by associating these
drives with dangerous ‘demons’, which they feared, and against which they would be
intrinsically motivated to struggle. Such images would generate con-affects that
would provide the motivation to act to suppress and stiﬂe their drives rather than
satisfy them. They became early artists instead, and scientists, expressing their drives
in ways that would no longer be harmful to their communities.
Already for this local society-enabling mechanism of sublimation, the imagination
was extremely important in at least two ways. The imagination is used not only
to generate powerful con-affects by turning drives into demons, but is also used to
project and simulate speciﬁc, hard-to-achieve goals for the scientist or the artist,
projects that would require immense effort. For their achievement, innumerable
internal and external resistances would have to be overcome.
The religious and speciﬁcally Christian mechanism functioned by adding an
additional imaginary layer around the local sublimations of artists and scientists.
The imagination is used in order to simulate or project powerful scenarios such as
20 ‘Die V<erinnerlichung> entsteht <dadurch>, dass mächtige Triebe, denen mit Einrichtung des
Friedens und der Gesellschaft die Entladung nach außen versagt wird, sich nach innen schadlos zu halten
suchen, im Bunde mit der Imagination. Das Bedürfnis nach Feindschaft, Grausamkeit, Rache, Gewalt-
samkeit wendet sich zurück, “tritt zurück”; im Erkennen-wollen ist Habsucht und Erobern; im Künstler
tritt die zurückgetretene Vorstellungs- und Lügenkraft auf; die Triebe werden zu Dämonen umgeschaffen,
mit denen es Kampf gibt usw.’
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‘eternal damnation’ as punishment for the violation of absolute laws issued by an
omnipotent deity. These go beyond any images hitherto available to the imagination
and produce even more powerful affects in those who imagine such scenarios. Yet it
was not only fear of eternal punishment but also the anticipation and imagining of
eternal bliss and happiness that provided the affective framework to motivate a
disciplining of the drives. The affects such produced enabled a drive ordering of
almost all types: those who had already sublimated their drives through knowledge
and artistry (the outcomes of the local mechanism) would order them even further
according to Christian values (a global mechanism). And those who had been unable
to sublimate their drives using the local mechanism would be more likely to abide by
the laws and values of the religious and secular communities. In essence, what I am
trying to show here is that the agents I have just described were able to achieve self-
control through a mechanism I would like to call ‘mental simulation’, which allowed
them to experience affects that would motivate them to control themselves.
I think one problem for Nietzsche certainly lies in the anti-individualistic, group-
preserving aspects of the religious mechanism we have just described, which pre-
vented any ‘higher types’ from ﬂourishing. However, the real and indeed more
pressing problem is actually the breakdown of the religious mechanism. In many
respects, Christianity was a ﬂourishing way of cultivating and constraining even
those people who were not able to use the local mechanism to control and sublimate
their drives and become artists and scientists, and would have lived only by their
non-sublimated aggressive and sexual primary drives. ‘Eternal damnation’ and
‘paradise’ (or rather its loss) were able to do what society and its punishments
were not: control or aggregate even those self-systems.
Since its decline, however, the modern self-system is in danger of a disaggregation.
It carries too many contradictory lineages and drives to be uniﬁed (BGE 200). All
those many drives, affects, and values that we implanted and were implanted in us are
no longer constrained by the drive to please some higher power and the fear of
eternal punishment, and modern self-systems have lost the framework that gave
them their ‘will’, becoming unable to aggregate and discipline their many, and often
opposed, drives. The breakdown of the mechanism of willing manifests itself in
scenarios where A reﬂectively judges she ought to do ç and yet ends up Ł-ing. The
imagination is no longer providing the images, no longer awakens the affects that
motivate constraint. She çs, Łs, and s but without any overarching goal. Also, because
former values and duties were based on absolute authority, all secular goals that
come to mind, or are proposed by others, feel arbitrary and hardly affect her.
This captures in part what Nietzsche describes as decadence, for resistance scenarios
if not ascetic are decadent. As Nietzsche describes it in EH, ‘the true sign of decadence,
being seduced by what is harmful, not being able to ﬁnd your advantage any more (das
eigentliche de´cadence-Abzeichen, das Gelockt-werden vom Schädlichen, das Seinen-
Nutzen-nicht-mehr-ﬁnden-ko¨nnen)’ (EH IV 8). Long-term goals lack motivational
force. The self-system falls into a state of low efﬁcacy, i.e. unfreedom and dependence,
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because attempts to discipline or unify the drives are no longer successful, resulting in
what Nietzsche calls the modern human being of ‘profound mediocrity’, who feels
‘unfree’ (NL 1886–7, KSA 12, 7[3]).
Against the previous ascetic ideals and the mediocre post-religious random ebb
and ﬂow of drives, new goals that unify the drive selves would again require the
disciplining of the drives, as BGE 188 suggests:
What seems to be essential, ‘in heaven and in earth,’ is that there be obedience in one direction
for a long time. In the long term, this always brings and has brought about something that
makes life worth living—for instance: virtue, art, music, dance, reason, intellect—something
that transﬁgures, something reﬁned, fantastic, divine.
Again, Nietzsche tacitly argues from the resistance axiom. All the activities that made
life worth living required ‘obedience’, the ordering of all drives in view of a goal. But
how is it to be achieved? He regards this ordering as vital, particularly in light of the
breaking down of the ordering mechanism Christian morality had provided. How
can we make good his idea of agents that ‘proudly’ compose themselves, ‘have [their]
affects, [their] For and Against, voluntarily’ (BGE 284), and reach ‘proﬁciency and
ﬁnesse in waging war with oneself (which is to say: the ability to control and outwit
oneself)’ (BGE 200)? Nietzsche is not very clear on how this is supposed to be
possible. Rather than telling us how such new, non-ascetic agency might be possible,
he describes ‘higher types’ that he regards as exemplars of a new ideal of agency. It is
to these exemplars that I wish to turn to next.
6 Higher Types? (Resistance Axiom II)
It seems as if Nietzsche applies the resistance axiom of freedom as a kind of litmus
test. In TI IX 38 ‘My Conception of Freedom’, Nietzsche analyses the ‘highest type of
free man’ and provides important clues for his later psychology of freedom. ‘How is
freedom measured in individuals and peoples?’, he asks:
According to the resistance that must be overcome, according to the exertion required to
remain on top. The highest type of free men should be sought where the highest resistance is
constantly overcome: ﬁve steps from tyranny, close to the threshold of the danger of servitude.
[ . . . ] freedom exactly in the sense in which I understand it: as something one has and does not
have, something one wants, something one conquers. (TI IX 38)
For the highest types, resistance is not the exception but rather what they value, their
norm. Highest-type freedom requires resistance in two directions. In one sense, one
must be close to ruling but not overruling because overruling would end the
resistance. Simultaneously, one must be close to enslaving oneself and resisting
because subjugation would end the resistance. The ‘highest types’, Nietzsche points
out, have a standing desire for freedom, freedom is what they ‘want’, and they seem
to know freedom’s secret: because freedom is what they want, they engage in projects
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that require maximal effort, set themselves maximal resistance goals, and, as a result,
they achieve the highest possible sense of agency. Nietzsche seems to assume that the
anticipation of the highest freedom or self-efﬁcacious agency has motivational force,
which enables the higher types to discipline and order their drives in view of long-
term resistance goals.
Goethe is described as another important exemplar. He is cited as someone who
was able to set himself many goals and who displayed a higher, non-ascetic totality of
multiple drives (NL 1887, KSA 12, 9[179]), which was not the result of a reductive
uniﬁcation. He ‘disciplined himself to a wholeness, he created himself ’, he was
‘strong enough for this freedom’, achieved a non-reductive ‘tolerance, but not out
of weakness’ (TI IX 49).
The ‘highest type of free men’ seek resistances and non-ascetically allow as many
drives as possible to be active at the same time, but within a hierarchy so that they do
not cancel each other out, and work towards one goal or towards the achievement of
a common, hard-to-achieve project. A lot more could be said here but we need to
press on because there is a second aspect to the resistance axiom that Nietzsche
introduces in TI IX 38.
He observes that resistance does not only create the feeling of freedom and sustain
the sense of self-efﬁcacious agency. Maximizing and copying with effort and resist-
ance also creates a particular kind of affective relationship to the ends thereby
achieved, namely an attitude of appreciation or valuing. As he puts it at the beginning
of TI IX 38: ‘The value of something does not lie in that which one attains by it, but in
what one pays for it—what it costs us.’
The claim is that ends achieved or reached by effort due to resistance, ends for
which one has to expend a lot, will be ‘dear’, and because they are dear, they will be
‘valuable’. The resistance axiom is therefore extended as follows:
(i) The degree of freedom, sense of agency, and authorship is proportional to the
resistance overcome; and
(ii) The degree of freedom is coextensive to a pro-affect of appreciation or
valuing. It follows that the:
(iii) Value or meaning of something (object, activity, event, goal, life) is propor-
tional to the resistance overcome.
Ends that do not involve resistance and exertion do not, or only minimally, make the
agent feel free and efﬁcacious, and ends reached rather than achieved will not be as
dear or valuable to the agent. Consequently, the highest types would not only be
those whose existence yields a sense of agency; also, due to maximal exposure to
resistance, their existence is also maximally valuable to them. When something is
dear and valuable it is something that one cares about and to which one ascribes
meaning, towards which one will have a powerful pro-affect, an afﬁrmative ‘yes’. It
is immediately clear that the higher types are an attractive species for Nietzsche, who
is critical of agents who only minimally sustain their sense of agency by ascetically
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denying life; who, once the breakdown of the Christian motivational mechanism
takes effect, will no longer even be able to do the latter, let along afﬁrm life non-
ascetically.
This is all well and good, but isn’t higher type agency and afﬁrmation only possible
precisely for those who actually are born as highest types? Or is Nietzsche pointing
out a ‘mechanism of willing’ that the higher types employ naturally but that
might nevertheless enable many agents to ‘reach proﬁciency and ﬁnesse in waging
war with themselves’ and perhaps enable them ‘to control and outwit themselves’
(BGE 200)?
7 The Mechanism of Willing: Simulating Freedom
In this last part, I want to investigate brieﬂy if Nietzsche’s insights might be useful for
a motivational theory that would help us make sense of his ideal of non-nihilistic
agents who can set themselves long-term goals and projects and achieve an afﬁrma-
tive attitude towards life.
Let us return to the motivational mechanism Nietzsche detected in his negative
exemplars: the mechanism always involved a process of deliberation or weighing that
I called a mental simulation, which was in part cognitive (involving reﬂective
judgement and beliefs) and in part non-cognitive (involving drives, affects, feelings,
and emotions).21 During this mental simulation, the ﬁrst-person perspective, namely
affects that have a certain qualitative feel, a leaning for or against, plays an important
role. Nietzsche assumes that societies and religions always provided the materials for
the mental simulations their ‘subjects’ could use to ‘affect’ their self-systems in such
a way as to achieve the right kind of self-discipline. This is what Nietzsche means
by the casual remark: ‘How did the possibility of eternal damnation take effect!’
(NL 1881, KSA 9, 11[203]).22 Now, let us see if this motivational mechanism can
really yield what it promises.
As we know from experience, agency takes place within an optional ﬁeld. If we
stay within the drive heuristics, then we can say that some options are related directly
to our own drives and concomitant affects. Other options might be related to
21 I propose (but cannot defend here) that Nietzsche as both philosopher and psychologist assumes
something like an early version of a simulation theory. For an early overview of the debate between theory
theory and simulation theory, see Davies and Stone (1995); for a recent comprehensive defence of mental
simulation, mainly focused on mindreading others, see Goldman (2006). On reasoning and emotional
cognition as affective response to simulating one’s own future states, see for example Thagard (2006). On
some of the problems that simulation theory faces in explaining intersubjective understanding, see
Gallagher (2007).
22 ‘Wie hat die Mo¨glichkeit der ewigen Verdammniß gewirkt!’ In NL 81, KSA 9, 11[203] Nietzsche
discusses the idea of eternal return. I take this passage to be an indication that Nietzsche conceives of
eternal return primarily as a thought experiment, a thought experiment that can have real, affective-
motivational effects, in the same way as the idea of eternal punishment had real affective, motivational
effects and enabled agents to control their drive selves. I discuss this in Dries (forthcoming).
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reﬂectively held beliefs, or values and affects that express the aims of others or even of
institutions, groups, or societies, rather than our own. The ﬁrst set of options, let us
call them autonomic options, function like intentions: we would be motivated to
carry them out. The second set of options, heteronomic options, lack this intentional
force: we would not be motivated to act in the same way as we are when an option
is autonomic, i.e. directly related to our own drives and their affective orientations.
So how is it that we are sometimes able to go against our immediate autonomic
options and act upon and carry out heteronomic options, e.g. a task that ‘we really
did not feel like doing’?
One possibility would be to assume that there was some drive that takes charge and
turns a heteronomic option into an autonomic option. For example, I have promised
a friend that I would meet for dinner (a heteronomic option). Come Saturday night
I no longer feel like going (no pro-affect or rather a con-affect ‘shows up’when I think
about or simulate going for dinner). Also, I can immediately think of things I would
rather do (some autonomic option, for which pro-affects show up immediately). If
I do not go, I anticipate my friend will be disappointed (a con-affect shows up, I don’t
want to go to dinner, but I also don’t ‘feel like’ disappointing my friend). This is when
I begin to deliberate, to simulate possible courses of action and their implications.
When I think about it for a little longer, when I look at the website of the restaurant,
I realize that they serve excellent coˆte de boeuf there. It turns out that I am presently
hungry, and as I particularly like coˆte de boeuf—together with wanting to avoid
disappointing my friend (after all, I think, what would I be without my friends and
I shudder)—I suddenly witness the emergence of a motivational pro-affect and
alongside that the thought that ‘it might not be such a bad idea, it might even be
the right thing to go after all’. And off I go.
What has happened here? Our simulative ‘reasoning’ and weighing resulted in ﬁrst
the emergence of motivational force and then an action, when the agent, consciously
or unconsciously, ‘listened’ to his affects. The intellect seems to play an important
part in this simulation. There is some kind of cognitive penetration. It is the intellect
that in moments of indeterminacy ‘offers’ different kinds of options or drives aims to
different drives. Let us look at this in a bit more detail.
We mentally simulate an action and experience how our affects respond. (Some-
times people ﬂip a coin in order to decide what course of action to choose. But they
ﬂip the coin not in order to let chance decide, but in order to ﬁnd out how they
affectively respond to the coin’s ‘selecting’ the one or the other option. This will show
them what they really want.) When a deliberation/simulation does not result in any
pro-affect, we might either respond that we ‘won’t do it!’ or we could also try to
widen the scope of the simulation. For example, we often simulate consequences of
our actions and think of the implications of our not carrying out the action.
Eventually, we might stumble across something that motivates us via a strong affect
or we ‘build up’ motivational force cumulatively, i.e. a number of contributing affect-
reasons emerge.
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The example I chose has, of course, very little to do with the kind of higher, life-
afﬁrming agency that Nietzsche seems to require. It is far from using and disciplining
drives in view of a resistance-rich, hard-to-attain, creative long-term goal to which
I subject myself. Can we imagine a scenario that would be more ﬁtting?
A sense of agency and anticipation of increased self-efﬁcacy are, Nietzsche
believes, intrinsically motivating. What if we deliberated possible actions according
to their potential to either increase or decrease our self-efﬁcacy? If we had a standing
desire for self-efﬁcacy, it might motivate us to carry out certain actions, motivate us
to select resistance scenarios that require extreme effort, because such actions would
yield a higher agency freedom and the ends thereby achieved would really matter to
us. Would this kind of simulation perhaps motivate speciﬁc activities (such as
‘ﬁnishing writing a book’ rather than ‘watching a TV series’)? And would it also
induce justiﬁcatory thoughts about that selection (‘ﬁnishing the manuscript is the
right thing to do’)?
Nietzsche thinks he might have found a solution to the puzzling question: ‘what
“affects”, effects and rules the hierarchy of a self-system’s drives?’ If the constitutive
drive for self-efﬁcacy (‘freedom’) became conscious (rather than disguised behind
altruistic, ascetic acts), then it could actually be used to ‘evaluate’ the possible
constellations and options and generate pro- or con-affects depending on the
increase or decrease of our agency freedom. As we saw, the Christian too relied on
his instinct for agency freedom and self-efﬁcacy, but not consciously. The ‘Christian’
cognitively disapproves of self-efﬁcacy, instead practicing and thinking he ought to
practice self-effacement. All the while, Nietzsche thinks, he is relying on the resist-
ance axiom in a clandestine manner. If, on the other hand, the motivational force that
issues from the desire for self-efﬁcacy became known—what then?
Take another example: a recovering alcoholic is very tempted to give in to his
strong and still active desire to have another drink. We know that many alcoholics
relapse but we also know that some succeed and avoid relapse. How might they
achieve control over their desire? Could a conscious simulation of the effort involved
and anticipated self-efﬁcacy, despite his strong affective orientation towards a drink
(the world he perceives seems to present him with an almost inescapable path
towards that next drink), motivate him to continue to resist his drive? Satisfying
his desire for a drink would satisfy only a ﬁrst-order desire and yield only a very
minimal experience of freedom triggered by overcoming the resistance to the drive’s
satisfaction. He anticipates a much greater overall self-efﬁcacy from resisting a drink.
Nietzsche thinks we often have affective reactions that indicate that we already,
without consciously doing so, evaluate a situation according to its potential to
increase our self-efﬁcacy or sense of agency. Pride is one of the affects he singles
out in this respect. Human ‘pride’ can give rise to and motivate a ‘desire’ to combat
any strong drive that is felt as ‘enslaving’ the self. In Daybreak, Nietzsche refers to
‘pride’ as father of the idea of freedom: ‘the doctrine of freedom of will has human
pride and feeling of power for its father and mother?’ (D 128). In which sense is pride
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/6/2015, SPi
158 MANUEL DRIES
used here? He sees pride as both the indication of a motivation from an immediate
evaluation of a situation as possibly being too difﬁcult for me, but as expressing the
motivation to overcome this resistance, such as when we say someone is ‘too proud to
fail’. But it is also often an affect that anticipates achievement and follows exertion of
some kind. This is part of what Nietzsche might have in mind here.
Let us return to our alcoholic. Supported by his pride against enslavement by
his desire, simulating what it would be like to resist his craving for a drink, order-
ing water instead, and projecting what would be involved in ultimately resisting
and starving the desire for alcohol he feels enslaved by (the simulation can go this
far), would allow him to feel the possibility of a decrease in dependence and an
increase in agency freedom and efﬁcacy. He might, for example, imagine himself
losing his job or his partner, he might anticipate himself in a weak, dependent,
inefﬁcacious position unable to successfully cope with life’s challenges or unable to
strive for other goals. But he might also get a sense of what it would feel like to resist
successfully. This kind of evaluation might motivate him to avoid relapse and to
recover.
Have we humans lost our pride? Nietzsche is a complicated internalist when it
comes to practical reason. He does not ﬁnd evidence that reﬂective judgements and
beliefs are by themselves motivating. Something else is required to transform beliefs
about what one could do into something like intentions that are already motivated.
While most commentators insist that Nietzsche rules out the possibility of ‘willing’,
this is not exactly true. Rather, as I have tried to argue, Nietzsche thinks that willing is
a mechanism that is hard to spot because we have interpreted the phenomenology of
willing in such a way that it misunderstands the full ‘mechanism’. As he writes in
GS 127: ‘willing is actually such a well-practised mechanism that it almost escapes
the observing eye’. For there to be ‘will’, Nietzsche suggests a simulation of attraction
or repulsion is necessary:
ﬁrst, in order for willing to come about, a representation (Vorstellung) of pleasure or displeas-
ure is needed. Secondly, that a violent stimulus is experienced as pleasure or pain is a matter of
the interpreting intellect, which, to be sure, generally works without being conscious of it (uns
unbewusst); and one and the same stimulus can be interpreted as pleasure or pain. Thirdly,
only in intellectual beings do pleasure, pain, and will exist; the vast majority of organisms has
nothing like it. (GS 127)
So, there is willing after all. And while it had long been misunderstood or misinter-
preted as causa sui, as a property of souls, of inner spectators with causal powers, etc.,
it is actually a mechanism that, once it is understood, might no longer remain and
function as undetected as before. Once this complex drive psychology is disentan-
gled, it is no longer a surprise that the later Nietzsche begins to imagine ‘free’ agents
who can utilize what they now know of themselves, and learn how to perfect, how to
‘have their drives and affects voluntarily’. Nietzsche is not at all opposed to the ‘well-
practised mechanism’. He is against the heteronomic, ascetic utilization by those who
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were not aware that they felt like causa sui agents only because they had (been)
turned against themselves. What if a self-system learned to no longer simply trust her
affects, but instead learned to utilize them?23
Understanding ourselves as complex, embedded self-systems who derive their
sense of agency as efﬁcacious agents from effort and resistance scenarios, from
creative activities, might restore the mechanism of willing in the absence of the
powerful illusions that have hitherto kept it going. Provided self-systems would learn
how to value what is contingent and relative, with the same intensity they once loved
gods, they might become agents who could set themselves circumspect goals, goals
for which they are and feel responsible, out of a deep (affectively embedded) sense of
concern, love, and responsibility for an unknown future as their task. ‘Self-regulation
is not achieved at once’, Nietzsche writes in a note in 1881: ‘The maximally free
human being has the greatest feeling of power over himself, the greatest knowledge
about himself, the greatest order in the necessary struggle among his powers’ (NL
1881, KSA 9, 11[130]).
As Katsafanas (2009; 2013) has recently argued, Nietzsche proposes that agents are
‘committed to valuing power merely in virtue of acting’ (2009: 657), and that power
should thus be seen as ‘the constitutive aim of action’. It is for this reason that power
enjoys a ‘privileged normative status’ (657) in Nietzsche’s philosophy. While I agree
with much of Katsafanas’s compelling constitutivist reading, I hope to have shown
that Nietzsche’s interest in power, and its privileged normative status, cannot be fully
appreciated unless it is viewed as part of his analysis of the phenomenon of freedom.
Nietzsche values power, but most of all he values freedom, if correctly understood,
and agents who experience freedom in their afﬁrmative pursuit of the right kinds of
ends. Sufﬁce to say that none of this determines our substantive values and ends, or
limits them to freedom and power for their own sake. What kinds of values we hold,
or better, create, and what ends we deem worthy of pursuit will always have to be
determined, negotiated, and then most likely renegotiated when circumstances
change. Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s analysis of freedom, as constitutive of and an
important motivator for action, might help the kinds of things we are determine
what kinds of good life we could be motivated to pursue.24
23 The drive monitors the self-system’s activities along the lines Nietzsche suggests in a preparatory
note: ‘Does this stimulus increase or decrease our efﬁcacy’ (NL 1880–1, KSA 9, 10[F100]/9). The strong
affects thereby produced provide the early components that give self-systems their ‘will’, albeit largely
unconsciously. Also, a feeling of unfreedom is sufﬁcient to feel oneself as an agent, albeit inefﬁcacious.
Recent research into the function of emotions suggests that emotions are mental states that express and
thereby make available to a self-system very complex states that involve sense data, memory, tacit beliefs,
etc. (e.g. Damasio 2003). They are therefore of vital importance as they can provide feedback and
‘information’ that would not otherwise be available to a self-system. On Nietzsche’s anticipation of
views in contemporary cognitive neuroscience, see Welshon (this volume).
24 I am indebted to audiences in Geneva, London, and Oxford. The Cambridge Philosophical Research
Colloquium devoted a session to an earlier version of this chapter. I am particularly grateful for comments
by Raymond Geuss, Richard Raatzsch, Christian Skirke, Margaret Clare Churchill Ryan, and OUP’s two
anonymous reviewers.
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